A $35 Firewall for the Developing World by Nabi, Zubair
A $35 Firewall for the Developing World
Zubair Nabi
IBM Research, Dublin
zubairn@ie.ibm.com
Abstract
A number of recent efforts aim to bridge the global digi-
tal divide, particularly with respect to Internet access. We
take this endeavor one step further and argue that Internet
access and web security go hand in glove in the develop-
ing world. To remedy the situation, we explore whether
low-cost platforms, such as Raspberry Pi ($35) and Cu-
bieboard ($59), can be used to implement security mech-
anisms. Using a firewall as a motivating security appli-
cation we benchmark its performance on these platforms
to test our thesis. Our results show that these platforms
can indeed serve as enablers of security functions for
small sized deployments in the developing world, while
only consuming less than $2.5 worth of electricity per
device per annum. In addition, we argue that the use of
these platforms also addresses maintenance challenges
such as update roll-out and distribution. Furthermore, a
number of additional network functions, such as caching
and WAN acceleration can also be implemented atop this
simple infrastructure. Finally, we posit that this deploy-
ment can be used for in-network monitoring to facilitate
ICT4D research.
1 Introduction
Over the course of the last few decades, the Internet
has matured into a repository of human knowledge, a
medium for dissemination of ideas, and more generally,
an all-encompassing portal for planet-scale connectivity.
It has also become an integral part of the global economy.
So much so that in the period between 2006 and 2011, it
accounted for 21% of GDP growth in developed coun-
tries [20]. In addition, maturity in the Internet ecosystem
has resulted in a higher standard of life [20]. In the same
vein, Internet access coupled with social media has be-
come a catalyst for social, cultural, and political activism
and change [32, 35, 33, 36]. While the Internet has been
declared a basic human right [29], in reality more than
two-thirds of the world population—which lives on less
than two dollars a day [11]—does not have access to it.
This Internet blackout can be attributed to a set of tech-
nological, social, and economic factors.
To bridge this connectivity gap, researchers, social en-
trepreneurs, and industry specialists have explored and
deployed a number of radical solutions. These range
from wireless networks driven by WiMAX [17, 10],
satellite [21], ZigBee [27], long-distance WiFi [26],
wireless mesh [16], and cellular links [14] to wired tech-
nologies enabled by optical, dial-up, and analog cable
networks [23]. These backbone and last mile access net-
work technologies are augmented by a similarly rich ar-
ray of conventional and unconventional optimizations,
including aggressive caching [5], prefetching and offline
access [24], P2P content sharing [28], and village-level
kiosks [8, 17]. Unfortunately, Internet backbone connec-
tivity is still a bottleneck factor due to its high-cost [28].
This coupled with the limited data rate of some of these
technologies, restricts end-user connectivity to the kilo-
bit order. Cognizant of the potential of such a large
untapped market, technology giants have also recently
jumped into the fray, with Google and Facebook lead-
ing the way with Project Loon [12] and Internet.org [37],
respectively.
Above all, the network security model in the develop-
ing world is considerably different than what the secu-
rity research community and the technology industry has
hitherto focused on [6, 7, 25]. This is evinced by the dis-
proportionally high rate of cybercrime originating in de-
veloping countries. In addition, these countries reside on
the higher end of the global spam scale as well as botnet
activity [6]. On the one hand, these problems weaken the
security and resilience of the worldwide Internet infras-
tructure and on the other, they hamper widespread de-
ployment by denting the confidence of the average user
in technology. According to Ben-David et al., the multi-
faceted factors specific to developing countries include
lack of regular online software and firmware updates due
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to limited bandwidth, shared computing resources, low-
literacy of the users, and rampant software piracy [6].
1.1 Another Brick in the Firewall
Viruses are especially uncontrollable in Internet cafes—
which are a primary source of connectivity for most
users in the developing world—due to shared USB flash
drives, untrained users, and limited financial and hu-
man resources [7]. Some researchers have gone to the
extent of arguing that virus ecology and epidemiology
in the developing world is fundamentally different than
the developed world [25]. Furthermore, the networks in
these regions are largely insecure due to the high cost of
enterprise-grade middleboxes such as firewalls and thus
the networks are susceptible to even simple port scans.
Fortunately, the research community has started pushing
for generalized middleboxes [30], although the target so
far has been high-end applications [31].
In this paper, we explore how the recent calls for mid-
dlebox innovation can be leveraged to break the security
status quo in the developing world. Specifically, we try to
ascertain whether low-cost platforms such as the Rasp-
berry Pi [13] and Cubieboard [3] can be used as mid-
dleboxes to implement firewall functionality to protect
alternative network deployments or small Internet cafe
level LANs. These networks include those supported by
long-distance WiFi, WiMAX, and Zigbee, to name a few.
While we benchmark the performance of a firewall ap-
plication on these two platforms, our thesis is in no way
limited to them. The case is equally applicable to other
similar platforms such as Utilite [4], Arduino [1], and
BeagleBoard [2]. In fact, as we discuss further on, plat-
forms such as the NetFPGA are also viable options. Fur-
thermore, the platforms can also be used to provide other
security services such as local software upgrade patches
and intrusion detection systems as well as more general
middlebox applications such as content caching and traf-
fic shaping.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2
we give an introduction to our target alternative networks
and low-cost platforms. §3 presents our target applica-
tion and its evaluation on two low-cost platforms. Gen-
eral use-cases and platforms are discussed in §4. We
summarize relevant related work in §5 and finally con-
clude in §6.
2 Background
In this section, we first present alternative networks
which have been designed specifically for the develop-
ing world and then analyse various low-cost, single-chip
devices.
Technology Net Bandwidth (Mbps)
ZigBee [27] 0.060
Satellite [21] 1
Wireless mesh [16] 2.5
Long-distance WiFi [26] 5
WiMAX [10] 6
Table 1: Comparison of Alternative Networks
2.1 Alternative Networks
Alternative networks augment existing technologies by
customizing them to support low-cost, low-power, and
low-maintenance. Table 1 lists the solutions that have
been deployed in various locations around the world and
their data rates. We discuss these in detail in this section.
Long-distance WiFi Long-distance WiFi initiatives
extend the range of the specification by modifying the
MAC layer. One such implementation, dubbed WiLD-
Net [26], addresses three shortcomings in the vanilla
802.11 protocol for long-distance communication: 1)
sub-optimal link-level recovery, 2) frequent collisions
due to CSMA/CA, and 3) inter-link interference. To this
end, it uses bulk packet acknowledgement, TDMA en-
abled by loose time synchronization, and adaptive loss-
recovery.
ZigBee Lo3, which stands for “Low-cost, Low-power,
Local communication”, advocates the use of 802.15.4
for rural connectivity [27]. The use of 802.15.4 enables
the setup to minimize its energy footprint by consuming
power on the µW and mW scale during idle and nor-
mal operation, respectively. To negate investment in a
centralized tower, Lo3 makes use of a mesh network in
which the medium is arbitrated by centralized TMDA.
Satellite Satellite networks have also been employed
for backbone connectivity in rural areas. For instance,
in rural Zambia, VSAT (Very Small Aperture Termi-
nal) satellite connections are being used to provide In-
ternet connectivity [21]. This bandwidth is then dis-
tributed through a three-tier WLAN within the commu-
nity: one main tower (wide-area backbone) connected
to the VSATs and peered with other towers (local-area
backbone), which in turn provide connectivity to end-
hosts through Ethernet and wireless access points.
WiMAX WiMAX greatly reduces the cost of network
deployment and also increases its reach to rural areas
where the geographic terrain is not amenable to cop-
per and optical wiring. Lele et al. [17] advocate the
use of such a deployment in rural India, where a single
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Component Raspberry Pi Cubieboard
(Model B)
Processor (MHz) 700 1000
GPU (GLFOPS) 24 7.2
Memory (MB) 512 1024
Ethernet 10/100 10/100
Price ($) 35 59
Table 2: Feature-based Comparison of Platforms
WiMAX base station serves the entire community. Ar-
chitecturally, it revolves around a kiosk model in which
end-users with regular telephone sets are connected to
kiosks which in turn communicate with the base station.
Wireless Mesh As opposed to mainstream urban
networks—which depend on well planned antenna con-
figurations and nodes with multiple radios—networks
designed for rural areas in the developing world rely on
nodes with single radios [16]. This ensures low cost
and simplicity which are first-class goals for these net-
works. The single radio nodes are connected in the form
of a mesh to provide connectivity at the community level.
End-hosts therefore are connected through multiple hops
to the gateway.
2.2 Basic Platforms
In this section, we first give a feature-set overview of the
Raspberry Pi [13] followed by Cubieboard [3].
Raspberry Pi Raspberry Pi is powered by a Broad-
com system-on-chip multimedia processor with an ARM
1176JZF-S 700MHz processor and a VideoCore IV
24GFLOPS GPU. For storage it relies on an exter-
nal MMC or SD Card. Available in two models (A:
256MB RAM, 1 USB port, and B: 512MB RAM, 2
USB ports, and 10/100 Ethernet), it can be interfaced
with external components via GPIO (General-purpose
Input/Output) and UART (Universal Asynchronous Re-
ceiver/Transmitter). On the software side, a number of
popular Linux distributions, such as Debian and Fedora
have Raspberry Pi specific versions.
Cubieboard Cubieboard consists of an AllWinner
A10 system-on-chip processor with an ARM Cortex-A8
1GHz processor and a Mali 400 7.2GFLOPS GPU. For
storage, it relies on both built-in 4GB NAND Flash and
external slots for microSD and SATA. Moreover, it has
1GB RAM and 10/100 Ethernet. External interfacing
is enabled by 2X USB slots, I2C (Inter-Integrated Cir-
cuit), SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface), and LVDS (Low-
voltage Differential Signaling). Similar to the Raspberry
Chain Function
PREROUTING Pre-routing decision packets
POSTROUTING Post-routing decision packets
INPUT Incoming packets for local delivery
OUTPUT Outgoing packets
FORWARD Incoming packets for non-local delivery
Table 3: Default iptables chains
Pi, the Cubieboard is also driven by Debian and Fedora
based distributions.
Table 2 compares the key features of both platforms.
3 Motivating Application
Developing world countries—such as India, China, and
Brazil—are top sources of spam and botnet activity. To
make matters worse, the number of botnets in these coun-
tries is expected to exceed the developed world soon due
to the increase in digital connectivity as well as the poor
security hygiene of the area [34]. Therefore, in the fu-
ture, Internet security battle-lines will be drawn in the
developing world.
Traditionally, firewalls have been employed to stem
the botnet tide. Firewalls provide a first line of de-
fense on the network against malicious activity. Each
firewall has a list of rules that it enforces to keep un-
wanted traffic at bay. These rules decide if a certain
flow is to be accepted or rejected. In addition, these
rules can work at multiple levels in the protocol stack
from the link layer up to the application layer. Natu-
rally, the efficacy of any firewall is determined by its
ruleset. Multiple rules in tandem can be used (in the
form of a rule chain) to implement complex filtering poli-
cies. A key requirement is the ability to filter packets at
line-rate otherwise the network experiences a decrease in
QoS. Therefore, enterprise-grade firewalls are designed
to achieve fast processing while providing rich features
such as policy-based filtering and deep packet inspec-
tion. Unfortunately, enterprise-grade firewalls (and mid-
dleboxes in general) are cost-prohibitive. At the other
end of the spectrum, general-purpose machines can be
employed to perform basic firewalling.
The aim of this paper is to explore the use of the most
basic platforms for firewall functionality. To this end,
we use real-world firewall rule set cardinality to gauge
the throughput of low-cost platforms to protect alterna-
tive networks in the developing world. These platforms
can be considered as an example of commodity off-the-
shelf hardware which is more appropriate for these re-
gions [26]. Architecturally, we envision these firewalls to
be present at the backbone of alternative networks such
as those supported by long-distance WiFi or at the net-
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Figure 1: Raspberry Pi vs. Cubieboard
work gateway of Internet cafes. According to figures
from 2009, the average firewall contains 800 rules and
the maximum number in the wild is 20000 [9]. There-
fore, we use these numbers for our benchmarking.
3.1 Setup and Results
In this section, we present the results from our evalua-
tion of Raspberry Pi and Cubieboard. We used the stan-
dard iptables application in Linux as our test firewall.
iptables allows the user-space configuration of chains
of rules (default chains enumerated in Table 3) of the ker-
nel firewall (Netfilter) for IPv4. Stateful rules that
ACCEPT, REJECT, DROP1, or LOG a packet can be added
to these chains.
By default, the iptables module is not available in
the stock kernel disk image of both platforms. There-
fore, we linked the module in and recompiled the kernel
for a Linux distribution for each platform. For Raspberry
Pi we used a Wheezy Raspbian image with kernel ver-
sion 3.6.11 while for Cubieboard we used a disk image
from Linaro with kernel version 3.10.1. As our goal was
to measure the performance in terms of flow forward-
ing of each platform subject to firewall filtering, we used
iperf2 to measure throughput between the platform and
a standard host (a single hop away). We used the de-
fault settings for iperf which use TCP as the transport
with a window size of 16KB. A custom script was used
to add random rules to iptables. Figure 1 plots the
throughput of each platform as a function of the number
of firewall rules. Without any rules, Raspberry Pi has
a throughput of around 58Mbps as opposed to 54Mbps
1As opposed to REJECT in which the source is notified, DROP
silently drops the packet without any source notification.
2iperf allows the measurment of throughput for TCP and UDP
streams between two end-hosts.
for Cubieboard. As we increase the number of rules, the
performance of Cubieboard degrades more gracefully in
comparison to Raspberry Pi. This is due to the higher
processing power of Cubieboard (1GHz) versus Rasp-
berry Pi (700MHz). While relative numbers are immate-
rial for our cause, the analysis shows that both platforms
are capable of sufficient throughput (20Mbps Raspberry
Pi and 30Mbps Cubieboard) for an average number of
firewall rules (800) in the wild [9].
4 Discussion
The use of low-cost platforms simplifies update rollout
and also enables additional functions such as content
caching and remote monitoring while ensuring a low en-
ergy footprint. We discuss these and other topics in this
section.
4.1 Update Rollout
As mentioned earlier, one of the challenges in provid-
ing security (or any technology) in the developing world
is the low-literacy of both service providers as well as
end-users. In addition, the high cost of maintenance is
a major impediment. Therefore, it is useful to have sys-
tems that can be easily be upgraded and maintained. To
this end, SD Card support on low-cost platforms sim-
plifies application and ruleset rollout. For instance, the
OS pre-loaded with firewall rules can be supplied as an
SD Card image and quickly disseminated through self-
replication [22]. In addition, extra rules can be down-
loaded from the Internet on the fly as rules specific to the
local network evolve.
4.2 Higher Performance
For alternative networks, the 30Mbps for an average
number of firewall rules suffices. For networks with
higher bandwidth requirements, NetFPGA-like plat-
forms can be employed. NetFPGA-1G consists of 4 x
1Gb interfaces while the recent 10G version features 4 x
10Gb ports. The customized hardware (PCI board with
FPGA) and firewall software can enable near line-rate
processing.
4.3 Additional Functions
The extra CPU cycles and storage on the platform can be
employed for additional applications. For instance, the
storage can be used to provide network wide caching [5].
This will assist in keeping bandwidth usage in check.
Moreover, due to the volatility of these networks, con-
nectivity is intermittent. In such situations, popular con-
tent can be served from the firewall platform for tempo-
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rary offline access. Other potential applications include
WAN acceleration and pre-fetching [24].
4.4 Distributed Firewalls
Rule management can be further simplified by enabling
distributed firewalls [15]. In this architecture, we envi-
sion a centralized service which maintains lists of fire-
wall policies. These lists can be distributed based on ge-
ography or network behaviour similarity. These rules can
then be rolled out to Raspberry Pi or Cubieboard-enabled
platforms via IPSec mechanisms, for enforcement at the
edge.
4.5 NAT
An additional function that firewalls afford is network
address translation. NATs assist in obfuscating inter-
nal addresses. Internet cafes which are still thriving in
the developing world can benefit from this in two key
ways: 1) they can protect internal machines from mali-
cious traffic and 2) they can enable simple subnet alloca-
tions for devices behind the NAT.
4.6 Monitoring
We envision that each local device will also be connected
to a central server3 and will periodically communicate
different network statistics. This monitoring will help in
understanding the dynamics of firewalls in the develop-
ing world and in devising new firewall rules. In addition,
these statistics will also enable ICT4D practitioners and
researchers to understand the usage patterns of devices
and users in the wild. Finally, remote monitoring will aid
in diagnosing network-level problems which are beyond
the skill-set of the local workforce [8].
4.7 Energy Footprint
As power is a constrained resource in the developing
world [8], it is imperative to minimize the energy foot-
print of any additional infrastructure. Fortunately, Rasp-
berry Pi-like platforms draw minimal power. Raspberry
Pi Model B has a power rating of 3.5W, therefore it
will draw a maximum of 84W in a day. With an aver-
age cost of 8cents/kWh in India [18], a quick back-of-
the-envelope calculation reveals that the energy cost of
an always-on Raspberry Pi Model B powered firewall is
$0.01 daily or $2.45 annually, which makes it affordable
for widespread deployment. In fact, it can even be re-
moved from the power grid and powered by batteries to
3We do not necessarily mean a single server per se but potentially
a geo-distributed architecture that maintains either local or global net-
work state.
avoid equipment failure due to high power fluctuation in
these regions [8].
5 Related Work
Our work is inspired by Ben-David et al. [6] who argue
that security issues in the developing world are funda-
mentally different than the developed world. In particu-
lar, our firewall analysis is motivated by their insight that
this not only has an adverse effect on the global tech-
nological landscape but also hinders technology adop-
tion in the developing world. In a similar vein, [25]
has also argued for security solutions designed specifi-
cally for the developing world. To this end, Innoculous
is a self-contained tamper-proof anti-virus system on a
flash drive for virus detection and profiling [25]. Simi-
larly, Bhattacharya and Thies [7] present the dynamics
of viruses in Internet cafes in India. They also high-
light a number of research opportunities including com-
puter virus epidemiology, use of disk imaging for sim-
ple roll-back, taking advantage of loose privacy norms,
and leveraging the want of the owners to pay more for
virus reduction, such as subscription based training and
updated virus definitions via post. Our approach of
provisioning firewall rules along with the OS stack as
a disk image is a direct consequence of their recom-
mendations. While all of these proposals target secu-
rity in the developing world, to the best of our knowl-
edge this paper is the first attempt at employing low-
cost platforms for network security applications. Fi-
nally, our work has benefited from the rich body of
work [17, 10, 21, 27, 26, 16, 14, 23, 5, 24, 28, 8, 17]
that aims at providing low-cost connectivity in the devel-
oping world.
6 Conclusion
We explored the use of low-cost platforms such as Rasp-
berry Pi and Cubieboard for security applications in
the developing world. Our benchmarking of a firewall
proves that the capabilities of these platforms are suffi-
cient to fill the security void in developing regions. Us-
ing an average number of firewall rules, we showed that
a Cubieboard can achieve throughput of 30Mbps. The
use of low-cost platforms also simplifies application roll-
out in the form of an SD Card image. In addition, the
power draw of the deployment is small enough to make
it feasible and sustainable. We also discussed how the
same platform can be used for general networking appli-
cations such as WAN acceleration and content caching
and pre-fetching. Moreover, remote monitoring of these
platforms can both aid in network diagnostics as well as
enhancing ICT4D research by laying bare the character-
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istics of network traffic and user behaviour in the devel-
oping world.
In addition to field-testing and real-world deployment,
we are also interested in writing custom security appli-
cations such as firewalls and wrapping each in a Mirage
unikernel [19] and running it directly on baremetal Rasp-
berry Pi-like platforms. This has two main advantages:
1) It simplifies application shipment by turning the entire
stack into a single image and 2) It enhances the security
of the application itself by making its code type safe and
sealing it against runtime modification.
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